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ABSTRACT
The passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Online Copyright
Infringement Limited Liability Act engendered a monumental shift in the way copyright law
is applied by copyright holders. Where once copyright law was intended as a shield to
protect against infringing uses, the unilateral reporting and removal provisions contained
within these statutes have incentivized copyright holders to use the law as a sword, flagging
potentially infringing uses for removal first and asking questions about fair use later. The
ability of copyright holders to obtain the removal of online content with little or not review
from the online service providers, including YouTube, has even inspired some who have no
copyright interest in a given piece of content to boldly issue takedown notices without
consideration for what the law says. Cindy Lee Garcia, the plaintiff in Garcia v. Google, was
once such party, claiming a copyright interest in a five-second, overdubbed performance
found within a hideous anti-Islamic propaganda video that she was tricked into appearing
in. The Ninth Circuit’s original decision, granting Garcia her copyright and allowing her the
ability to have the content taken down, generated an unprecedented negative response from
the legal community, causing the Ninth Circuit to re-hear the case en banc and reverse its
original decision. This paper intends to provide background on the takedown provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, summarize the two Ninth Circuit Garcia opinions, and
analyze both the reaction to them and their impact on copyright moving forward.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An Overview of Copyright and the DMCA
As a threshold concept, something is not copyrightable unless it is a “work of
authorship” that is “fixed in a tangible means of expression.” 17 U.S.C. 102(a). The Ninth
Circuit has defined “author” as a “person to whom [a] work owes its origin and who
superintended the whole work.” Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000).
The statute considers a work “fixed in a tangible means of expression” when,
Its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission.
17 U.S.C. 101. For decades, the fixation requirement was satisfied by publication (in the case
of written works) or recording (in the case of music, film, or works of spoken word). The
ubiquity of the Internet, specifically the rise of video sharing websites such as YouTube, has
created an entirely new avenue for content creators to fix their works in a tangible means of
expression. Along with this new freedom, however, has come an entirely new set of
challenges in the realm of copyright. The ability of anyone, anywhere to record and upload
audio/visual content to websites such as YouTube has been both creatively liberating and,
increasingly, legally frustrating.
To keep up with the advancement of digital media and the advent of the Internet,
Congress implemented reforms to United States copyright law in 1998. 1 In addition,
Congress hoped to better fulfill the United States’ treaty obligations under the World
Executive Summary – Digital Millennium Copyright Act, U.S. Copyright Office, (October 15,
2015). http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_executive.html
1
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Intellection Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty of 1996. Id. 112 Stat. 2860, or
the “Digital Millennium Copyright Act” (DMCA), was the result of this effort, a comprehensive
series of additions and amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 that has been the subject
of much debate in the seventeen years since its passage. In order to help the United States
better comply with the WIPO treaty, the DMCA enacted safeguards “against circumvention
of technological protection measures employed by copyright owners to protect their works,
and against the removal or alteration of copyright management information.” Id. In drafting
the DMCA, Congress also made the determination,
To promote electronic commerce and the distribution of digital works
by providing copyright owners with legal tools to prevent widespread
piracy was tempered with concern for maintaining the integrity of the
statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners.
Id.

This Congressional determination was made law through the Online Copyright

Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), a portion of the DMCA encoded at 17 U.S.C.
512, that was passed in order to provide “a safe harbor to online service providers (OSPs,
including internet service providers) that promptly take down content if someone alleges it
infringes their copyrights.”2 Under OCILLA, copyright holders may approach OSPs and notify
them of any improper use of the copyright holders’ intellectual property (IP) being hosted
by the OSPs’ service. Id. Once notified, the OSP then removes or blocks access to the allegedly
infringing content and, in exchange, receives a number of legal benefits. The benefits to OSPs
include:
Protection from liability to [their] customers as a result of a decision to remove
[infringing] material . . . Clear procedures for removing [infringing material]
and restoring material [eventually found to be non-infringing] . . . [and] a safe
Online Copyright Infringement Limited Liability Act (OCILLA), The Anti-Abuse Project,
(October 15, 2015). http://www.anti-abuse.org/online-copyright-infringement-liabilitylimitation-act-ocilla/.
2
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harbor against copyright infringement claims, similar to the protection against
non-intellectual property infringement liability provided by Section 230 the
Communications Decency Act (CDA).
Id. The exchange was intended to provide immunity from liability to innocent OSPs whose
services are used by copyright infringers to host infringing content.
Notice under OCILLA has a number of requirements before it is deemed adequate
under the statute. In order to effectively put an OSP on notice, a written communication must
be delivered to one of the OSP’s designated agents that meets a number of criteria. 17 U.S.C.
512(c)(3)(A). First, the owner of the allegedly infringed content must sign the
communication. Id. Second, the copyrighted work or works allegedly infringed on the given
website must be identified. Id. Third, the allegedly infringing content must be identified,
along with “information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the
material.” Id. Fourth, the notice must provide contact information for the complaining party.
Id. Fifth, the notice must contain “a statement that the complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law.” Id. Finally, there must be a statement that the information
contained in the notice is accurate and, “under penalty of perjury,” that the party issuing the
complaint is permitted to act on behalf of the allegedly infringed content’s owner. Id.
Once a valid notification has been received, the OSP may take down the allegedly
infringing content and thus be immune from liability for,
Monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled
or operated by or for the service provider.
Id. In order to fully qualify for the safe harbor, the OSP must also, upon obtaining notice, act
“expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” Id.
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One of the possible remedies provided to copyright owners under OCILLA is that of
an injunction. Id. OCILLA injunctions are subject to a number of limitations. Id at (j). An
injunction may be granted under OCILLA with respect to an OSP only in one of three possible
forms:
(i) An order restraining the service provider from providing access to
infringing material or activity residing at a particular online site on the
provider’s system or network[;] (ii) An order restraining the service provider
from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service
provider’s system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is
identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or
account holder that are specified in the order[; or,] (iii) Such other injunctive
relief as the court may consider necessary to prevent or restrain infringement
of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at a particular online
location, if such relief is the least burdensome to the service provider among
the forms of relief comparably effective for that purpose.
Id. In addition, injunctions may be granted only if they pass the four-part test for injunctive
relief contained in the statute. Id at (k). These considerations include: the burden on the
OSP; the magnitude of the harm to the copyright holder in the absence of an injunction; the
feasibility, effectiveness, and ability to not interfere with non-infringing material of an
injunction; and whether any less-burdensome means than an injunction exist to remedy the
infringement. Id.
OCILLA has caused the most tension as copyright law has been applied to the evolving
media landscape of the Internet in the present day. Nowhere has this tension been more
readily apparent, however, than on YouTube, where the power of having a voice and a
platform from which to express it has spawned a new breed of entertainers, among whom
are otherwise regular people who may not be entirely well-versed in copyright law. This
lack of sophistication on the part of newly-created authors on the internet has led to a system
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in which copyright owners have a great deal of power and the OSPs have little incentive to
resist their influence.
The Intersection of Copyright/OCILLA and YouTube
OCILLA’s notice and removal provisions have sparked the creation of what YouTube
has called its “ContentID” system.3 “ContentID” is a system by which YouTube flags videos
uploaded by users that may contain material that is copyrighted by someone else. Id. Every
video uploaded to YouTube gets scanned against a database of files submitted to YouTube
by copyright holders. 4 Once a video has been flagged by the system as containing
copyrighted material, YouTube sends notice to the owner of the copyright. Id. YouTube then
sends a notice to the creator of the video in question informing him or her that there may be
copyrighted material in the video and that the copyright holder may take further action. Id.
The copyright owner can choose to monetize the flagged video by running ads on it, track
the video’s viewership statistics, mute any audio that contains copyright material, or even
block the video from being viewed in specific locations or worldwide. Id.
When the copyright holder chooses to block access to a video containing copyrighted
material, the creator of the video receives a “copyright strike.”5 YouTube applies a copyright
strike to the creator of a video when that the owner of a valid copyright has sent YouTube a
legal request, in accordance with 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A), providing notice of infringing
content in the video being hosted on the site. Id. Once the formal notice has been received,

YouTube, What Is A ContentID Claim?, YouTube Help (2015).
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6013276.
4 YouTube, How ContentID Works, YouTube Help (2015),
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370
5 YouTube, Copyright Strike Basics, YouTube Help (2015).
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000.
3
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YouTube has almost no choice but to remove the content; failure to do so would result in the
removal of the safeguards provided by OCILLA to OSPs. Id. The creators of allegedly
infringing content have only three option when it comes to resolving copyright strikes, which
include: completing a YouTube-designed course in copyright, and receiving no additional
strikes for six months; contacting the copyright holder and requesting a retraction of their
copyright claim; or submitting a counter-notification that the video was either misidentified
as infringing or qualifies for fair use protections. Id.
“Fair Use” is the concept that allows the copyrighted content to be used without the
permission of the copyright holder provided that the content meets a four-part test.6 The
first consideration is the “purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” Id. For the first factor, courts
typically consider whether the new work is “transformative” by adding new expression or
meaning to the original work. Id. Commercial use of copyrighted material goes against a
finding of fair use, although it is possible to monetize an allegedly infringing use and still
receive fair use protections. Id. The second consideration is the nature of the copyright work
being drawn from; if the copyright work is one of fiction, for example, it may be harder to
receive fair use protections than if the copyright work were one of fact. Id. The third
consideration is the amount of the copyrighted work used in the allegedly infringing work,
with a finding of fair use being less likely the more of the original work has been used. Id.
The final consideration is the effect of the allegedly infringing use on the market for the

YouTube, What is Fair Use?, YouTube Copyright Center (October 15, 2015).
https://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/fair-use.html#yt-copyright-four-factors.
6
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original work. Id. If the new work, for example, takes profits away from the original work,
fair use is less likely to apply. Id.
Most of the controversy regarding ContentID has sprung from the potential for abuse
by copyright holders present in a system where works of expression may be suppressed or
removed unilaterally without a process for appeal in place until after the suppression or
removal occurs.7 One context where this issue has come up quite frequently, for example,
has been the realm of video game media; users on YouTube who create videos of themselves
playing video games and providing commentary (referred to as “Let’s Play videos”) have
become targets of the companies that own the video game IP. Id. While some video game
companies have expressed support for the YouTube community and disappointment with
YouTube’s system, the ContentID program has been abused by other companies both as a
way to prevent monetization of this fair use content and as a way of silencing harsh critics of
bad games. Id.
Criticism and commentary has become an essential part of the world’s economy
where entertainment is concerned. Consumers of entertainment media in all of its forms
(books, video games, television, music, film, etc.) can latch on to their favorite reviewers and
consult their reviews before purchasing a product. The ContentID system as it currently
stands allows the owners of IP to get videos removed from YouTube without filing for an
injunction just by sending a formal communication to YouTube claiming that their IP is being
infringed on. Id. The chilling effect such a system could have on free speech is obvious. As

Eric Kain, YouTube Responds to ContentID Crackdown, Plot Thickens, Forbes (December 17,
2013). http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2013/12/17/youtube-responds-tocontent-id-crackdown-plot-thickens/.
7
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mentioned above, the system even allows IP owners to divert monetization away from the
YouTube user who created the video, having the money sent to the IP owner instead. Id.
YouTube’s implementation of the ContentID system has almost no basis in the actual
copyright law itself. Id. The main reason why the system is in place is because YouTube
receives a cut of the money made from advertisement attached to every monetized video
hosted on the service. Id. If the owner of a copyright issues a formal takedown notice under
the DMCA, then YouTube has to remove the video entirely and, as a result, take no cut of the
money it makes. Id. By allowing the copyright holder to instead submit a claim under
ContentID, the video can stay up only with the money going to YouTube and the copyright
holder rather than the people who actually made the video in question. Id.
While these issues with ContentID and DMCA takedown notices would seem to have
little to do with an anti-Islam propaganda film, and the people who were tricked into
appearing in it, the problems of ContentID claims and DMCA/OCILLA takedowns are an everpresent concern to free speech on the internet, specifically on YouTube. A new front in the
battle for free Internet speech opened up three years ago, when a man named Mark Basseley
Youssef decided to create one of the most offensive short films of all time with the help of a
group of unwitting actors and crew. One member of the film’s cast, Cindy Lee Garcia,
attempted to send a takedown notice to YouTube based on her supposed copyright interest
in her performance. The resulting Ninth Circuit appellate case became almost as infamous
as the video itself, at least in the realm of copyright law.
II. Garcia v. Google 1
Factual Background/Procedural History
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Mark Basseley Youssef (also known as “Nakoula Basseley Nakoula” and “Sam Bacile”)
sent out a casting call for what he claimed to be a period action film set in the Middle East
called “Desert Warrior”. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 2014). One of the
actors who answered the call was Cindy Lee Garcia. Id. Garcia signed up to be paid $500 for
three and a half days of shooting; she was to appear in a very minor role, receiving only four
script pages on which she had any dialogue in the entire film. Id. Rather than actually finish
the “Desert Warrior” film, Youssef took the footage he shot with Garcia and the other actors
and dubbed over their voices with new dialogue that consisted almost entirely of anti-Islamic
language. Id. In one of her brief scenes, for example, Garcia’s character appeared to be asking
someone, “Is your Muhammad a child molester?” Id.
Once the actual film, re-titled as “Innocence of Muslims,” began making its way around
the world, it eventually reached Egypt. Id at 1262. The film’s anti-Islam sentiments led to
riots; an Egyptian Muslim cleric even called for the deaths of all who were involved in the
making of the film. Id. Ms. Garcia began receiving personal death threats shortly thereafter.
Id. In response to the death threats, Garcia began asking Google, the owners of YouTube, to
take the video down. Id. Garcia sent in eight DMCA takedown notices to Google, all of which
were met with resistance. Id. When Garcia provided substantive explanations for why the
video should have been taken down, Google still resisted. Id. In response, Garcia filed for a
temporary restraining order, claiming that Google’s hosting of the video on YouTube
infringed her copyright in her performance in the film. Id.
The district court in California treated the case as one for a preliminary injunction. Id.
In denying Garcia’s application, the district court reasoned that,
Garcia had delayed in bringing the action, had failed to demonstrate "that the
requested preliminary relief would prevent any alleged harm" and was
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unlikely to succeed on the merits because she'd granted Youssef an implied
license to use her performance in the film.
Id. In response to her failure in the district court, Garcia appealed the decision to the Ninth
Circuit. Id.
Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the denial of Garcia’s preliminary injunction under a fourfactor test. Id. The factors are: “a plaintiff's likely success on the merits, the likelihood that
irreparable harm will result if an injunction doesn't issue, the balance of equities and the
public interest.” Id. (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The
district court found against Garcia on the first two of these factors and, as a result, did not
consider the second two. Id. Stated plainly, the main issue for Garcia is that she had to prove
“not only that she likely has an independent interest in her performance but that Youssef
doesn't own any such interest as a work for hire and that he doesn't have an implied license
to use her performance.” Id.
The prevailing opinion on copyright interest in film is that films are joint works, the
end result of the efforts put in by a number of different people who may all be considered
“authors” of some portion of the end product.” Id. at 1262-63 (citing Nimmer On Copyright,
Section 6.05 at 6-14 (1990)). Garcia argued in front of the Ninth Circuit that she did not
qualify as a joint author of “Innocence of Muslims” and that she never intended her
performance to become part of the film as a “joint work.” Id at 1263. Judge Kozinski, writing
for the Ninth Circuit majority, reasoned that even in the absence of a joint author situation,
so long as the individual’s contribution to the film is both fixed and “sufficiently creative,”
then there could still be a copyright interest in the contribution. Id.
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Despite Google’s argument that Youssef wrote all the words Garcia spoke managed
the entire production, and even eventually replaced all of Garcia’s spoken performance with
dubbed dialogue, Judge Kozinski appeared convinced of the notion that “an actor does far
more than speak words on a page; he must ‘live his part inwardly, and then . . . give to his
experience an external embodiment.’" Id. (citing Constantin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares
15, 219 (Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood trans., 1936).
In breaking from years of copyright law in the realm of film authorship and film
copyright ownership, Judge Kozinski’s opinion would essentially separate the individual
contributions made by each actor and crew member to the film, providing them all a
copyright interest in that contribution. Id. at 1264. Kozinski’s opinion even twists the
language of Ninth Circuit copyright precedent into supporting this notion by quoting the
statement, “"authorship is required under the statutory definition of a joint work, and . . .
authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution." Id.
(citing Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232). The opinion incorrectly analogizes the question of
film authorship with “the author of a single poem” not necessarily becoming “a co-author of
the anthology in which the poem is published.” Id. at 1265. Such an analogy does not apply
become a poem is still separable from an anthology and can stand on its own, whereas the
contributions to a film combine to make the film what it is; the whole matters more than the
sum of its parts.
Once satisfied that Garcia’s performance was both fixed and sufficiently creative to
create a copyright interest, the majority opinion next focused on Google’s “Work For Hire”
argument. Id. Under the Work For Hire Doctrine, “the rights to Garcia's performance vested
in Youssef if Garcia was Youssef's employee and acted in her employment capacity or was an

17
independent contractor who transferred her interests in writing.” Id. (citing Cmty. For
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989). Film productions have presented a
unique problem when it comes to how one qualifies as an employee; since actors and crew
members are contracted to work on that single production alone, the lines between
traditional employment and independent contracting can become blurred. Id. As a way of
solving this problem, written agreements transferring all authorship rights to the owners of
the film in question (usually the film studio) are obtained before production begins. Id. Such
as was not the case with “Innocence of Muslims.” Id.
In the absence of a written agreement, the majority opinion rejected the notion that
Garcia was an employee because Youssef controlled every aspect of the production,
including the scenes in which Garcia appeared, and because Youssef was in the business of
making films at the time. Id. In making this rejection, the majority opinion merely dismissed
the notion of possible employment by claiming that there was no evidence in the record to
support the claim that Youssef controlled every aspect of the production or that he was in
the business of making films. Id. at 1265-66.
The majority opinion next considered whether there existed an implied license
between Garcia and Youssef giving Youssef the right to use Garcia’s performance to make
“Innocence of Muslims.” Id. Google argued that Garcia gave Youssef an implied license to use
her performance and the majority opinion agreed, holding that Garcia gave her performance
at Youssef’s request and handed it over to him, intending that he copy and distribute it. Id. In
addition, the majority acknowledged that “without an implied license, the performance for
which [Garcia] was paid would be unusable.” Id. Even in spite of the finding that there was
an implied license, and the additional concession that such licenses must be construed
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broadly so that an actor cannot derail a film’s release because it did not “meet [the actor’s]
ex ante expectation,” the majority still found that the use of Garcia’s performance in the
present case went to far beyond the license. Id. According to the majority,
Garcia was told she'd be acting in an adventure film set in ancient Arabia. Were
she now to complain that the film has a different title, that its historical
depictions are inaccurate, that her scene is poorly edited or that the quality of
the film isn't as she'd imagined, she wouldn't have a viable claim that her
implied license had been exceeded.
Id. at 1266-67. Not only was “Innocence of Muslims” not an adventure film set in ancient
Arabia, it wasn’t “intended to entertain at all.” Id. at 1267. The fact that Youssef had to lie to
Garcia to obtain her participation, the majority reasoned, was proof that he had exceeded the
license in making “Innocence of Muslims.” Id.
Turning to the irreparable harm argument, the majority broke with the district court
in its assessment that Garcia’s failure to bring her lawsuit immediately upon learning the
true nature of the film disproves her need for quick action, the hallmark of any granted
preliminary injunction. Id. Instead, the majority cited the nexus between the harm being
caused (the numerous death threats Garcia was receiving) and the conduct she sought to
enjoin (the copyright infringement). Id. at 1268. Since Youssef made “Innocence of Muslims”
by infringing on Garcia’s supposed copyright in her performance, the majority chose to “err
on the side of life” and weigh this factor of the preliminary injunction test in Garcia’s favor.
Id.
Finally, the majority considered the balance of the equities and the public interest
together during the final paragraphs of the opinion. Id. The balance of the equities was easy
for the majority to dismiss in Garcia’s favor because Youssef was fraudulent in his purpose
and because Google did not focus on the balance of the equities in their response. Id. Instead,
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Google focused on the public interest in leaving the video on YouTube, claiming that a
preliminary injunction against the video constitutes “unconstitutional prior restraint of
speech;” the majority countered by claiming that, because it has found Garcia had a copyright
interest in the performance, the Constitution does not protect against copyright
infringement. Id.
In the end, the majority opinion in Garcia 1 ultimately ordered the case was to be
reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 1269.
Dissent
The dissent in Garcia 1, written by Judge Smith, immediately criticized the majority
opinion be questions its categorization of the injunction as preliminary rather than
mandatory. Id. “Rather than asking to maintain the status quo pending litigation, Garcia
demands Google immediately remove a film from YouTube,” the dissent argued, and as such
the injunction must be given a high degree of scrutiny considering the Ninth Circuit disfavors
mandatory injunctions. Id. In fact, under Ninth Circuit precedent, mandatory injunctions
should only be issued if the “‘facts and law clearly favor the moving party.’” Id. (citing Stanley
v. Univ. of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (1994)). The dissent therefore argued
that “the majority may only reverse if it were illogical or implausible . . . for the district court
to conclude that the law and facts did not clearly favor Garcia.” Id. at 1269-1270 (citing United
States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Turning to the four Winter Factors, the dissent first discussed Garcia’s copyright
interest, or lack thereof, in her performance. Id. at 1270. Rather than categorize the acting
performance as its own separate and copyrightable work, the dissent instead argued that a
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performance actually resembles a “procedure” or “process” by which an original work (the
script) is performed. Id. The film itself was the “work,” according to the dissent. Id. at 1271.
In addition, the dissent questioned Garcia’s authorship over the film. Id.

To

accomplish this, the dissent compared Garcia’s contributions to “Innocence of Muslims” with
the contributions of Aalmuhammed to the film Malcolm X in the Aalmuhammed case. Id. The
court in that case concluded that Aalmuhammed,
“(1) Did not at any time have superintendence of the work," (2) "was not the
person 'who . . . actually formed the picture by putting the persons in position,
and arranging the place," (3) could not "benefit" the work "in the slightest
unless [the director] chose to accept [his recommendations]," and (4) made
"valuable contributions to the movie," but that alone was "not enough for coauthorship of a joint work."
Id. at 1272 (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000)). Garcia’s
contributions to “Innocence of Muslims,” in comparison were even less than
Aalmuhammed’s, who was at least an expert on Malcolm X and Islam and provided creative
consultation for Malcolm X’s actors. Id. Garcia conceded that she held no creative control
over the script (which was provided by Youssef) or her performance (which was directed y
Youssef). Id. While a work may have joint authors, those authors must have (1) intended
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole;
and (2) exercised meaningful creative control over the work. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at
1234. As a result of Garcia’s minimal contributions to the final film, the dissent finds it
illogical that Congress could have intended copyright law to apply in this scenario. Id. at
1272-73.
As to fixation, the dissent pointed to three cases that, when combined, help to
disprove Garcia’s claim. Id. In the first case, Bette Midler sued Ford for misappropriating her
voice; Ford had properly licensed one of Midler’s songs for use in a commercial but had hired
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someone to imitate her voice rather than use the original recording. Id. (citing Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988). Despite ultimately ruling in favor of Ford, the
Midler court still held that, while Midler’s voice was not copyrightable, the entirety of the
song was. Id. In the second case, Sony prevailed in a copyright preemption claim where they
properly licensed a song for use in a commercial but only used a portion of the actual song;
because Sony did not hire someone to imitate the original singer’s voice, they won the case.
Id. (citing Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006)). In the
third case, the Defendants illegally copied, reproduced, and counterfeited copyright
pornographic DVDs before selling sold the copies to third parties; the Ninth Circuit ruled in
favor of the original producers of the DVDs, holding they had a copyright interest in the DVDs.
Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146-1153 (9th Cir. 2010).
“Combined, these cases show that, just as the singing of a song is not copyrightable, while the
entire song recording is copyrightable, the acting in a movie is not copyrightable, while the
movie recording is copyrightable.” Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1274. The comparison of an actor’s
performance in a film to a singer’s performance in a recorded piece of music is an apt one, as
a singer and actor are both parts of a larger group of people that come together to create a
finished product. Id. at 1274-75.
Having defeated Garcia’s copyright interest argument, the dissent next turned to the
Work For Hire Doctrine. Id. The dissent placed a good deal of weight on the Work For Hire
Doctrine analysis, mainly because “in the United States most contributions to a motion
picture are created as works made for hire.” Id. at 1275 (F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee
Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev.
225, 238 (2001)). According to the undisputed record,
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Garcia conceded in her complaint and affidavit that Youssef "managed all
aspects of production," controlling both the manner and means of making the
film, including the scenes featuring Garcia . . . Youssef provided the
instrumentalities and tools, dictated the filming location, decided when and
how long Garcia worked, and was engaged in the business of film making at
the time. Additionally, Garcia did not hire or pay assistants.
Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1275. The dissent also distinguished the Garcia facts from those found in
Reid by explaining that, in Reid, a sculptor was hired to create a sculpture for a non-profit
organization that only had control over the specifications of the sculpture. Id. at 1275-76
(citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 752). The sculptor himself had control over all the other relevant
factors in the Work for Hire Doctrine analysis and, as a result, the Reid Court ruled in favor
of the sculptor. Id. at 1276 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 752). Here, Garcia had no control over any
aspect of her performance or over the film itself and, thus, was clearly an employee under
the Work For Hire Doctrine. Therefore, " the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
Following its Work for Hire discussion, the dissent next discussed the presence of
irreparable harm. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1276. The majority held that the district court abused
its discretion by finding that Garcia’s five-month delay in bringing suit was fatal to her
irreparable harm argument. Id. The dissent, instead, looked past the threats to Garcia’s life
and instead separated them from the legal rights that Garcia’s case is supposedly about
protecting. Id. “Were Garcia really trying to protect her purported copyright interest in her
acting performance, one would expect her to have brought this action immediately after
learning of the alleged infringing behavior.” Id. The only relevant harm for the irreparable
harm analysis, according to the dissent, is the one that occurs to the legal interests of the
parties; framing the issue that way, the dissent held that Garcia “failed to explain her delay
in terms of harm to her alleged copyright interest.” Id. Further, an aspect of irreparable harm
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in Garcia’s situation was whether or not preventing future viewings of the video on YouTube
would prevent future harm. Id. As Garcia admitted she had already gone public about her
condemnation of the video, there was really nothing further she could do since bring the
video down from YouTube would not prevent the people who had copied it to other sites
from viewing it. Id.
Separating the balance of the equities from the public interest, the dissent first
discussed how the balancing did not favor Garcia. Id. at 1277. Even if Garcia did have a
protectable copyright interest in her performance, the loss of her preliminary injunction
motion would mean she is “only faced with potential infringement of her potential copyright
interest pending a final disposition of this lawsuit.” Id. Further, if Garcia truly valued her
performance as much as her lawsuit would suggest, the dissent questioned why she did not
have a contract with Youssef outlining her rights. Id. “The facts evidence that she acted for
three days and was paid $500 dollars,” meaning her performance was not worth much effort
and, thus, neither is any potential copyright interest in it. Id. In addition, the dissent rejected
the majority’s discussion of Youssef in the balance of the equities because Youssef was not a
party to the court proceedings and Google was not a party to any transaction with Youssef.
Id. The dissent ultimately weighed the balance of the equities in favor of Google. Id.
Concerning the public interest, the dissent believe strongly in the idea that the public
‘s interest in a strong First Amendment is one of the most important concerns in any legal
action implicating free speech. Id.

However, the dissent did concede that the First

Amendment does not protect copyright infringement, although with the caveat that “if
Google was actually infringing Garcia’s copyright” it would not be protected. Id. Since Google
was not infringing any actual copyright owned by Garcia, the public interest in favor of
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protecting free speech by not taking the video down until after litigation should have won
out in the end. Id. at 1277-78. Unfortunately, the majority did not agree and, as a result, a
fierce backlash to such an unprecedented opinion began building around the country.
Reaction to the Decision
The negative reaction to the Garcia decision was almost immediate. Those who
criticized the opinion following its issuance could be categorized mainly into at least one of
three categories:
Some [argued] that the court erred in so ruling because Garcia’s performance
[did] not actually satisfy the Copyright Act’s requirements; others [suggested]
the court’s analysis [was] wrong because it [failed] to properly take into
account important legislative and constitutional protections of free
expression; and yet others [contended] the result [was] mistaken because of
its likely practical effects on certain business models.8
In addition to the common complaints, another concept arose from the Garcia case
concerning how Garcia was using copyright law to achieve goals for which it was not
intended. Id. Garcia “latched on to copyright as a means of removing the film [from YouTube]
once other options [for preventing people from seeing it] were deemed less than ideal.” Id.
Scholars and other members of the legal community were not the only ones coming
out against the original decision in Garcia.9 Netflix, the giant streaming video service, added
its voice to the chorus of parties urging the Ninth Circuit to hold a rehearing en banc in the
Garcia matter. Id. One apt comparison offered by Netflix was their questioning whether a bit
Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives in Garcia v. Google and Beyond, Stanford Law Review, 67
Stan. L. Rev. Online 37 (August 20, 2014). http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/expost-incentives-and-ip-in-garcia-v-google-and-beyond.
8

Eriq Gardner, Netflix Asks Appellate Court to Reconsider ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Ruling, The
Hollywood Reporter (April 15, 2014). http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/netflix-asks-appellate-court-reconsider-696226.
9
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actor in Gone With The Wind could have enjoined the distribution of that classic film because
he or she did not appreciate her performance appearing in a “Yankee propaganda” film. Id.
Netflix has no ability, it argued, “to determine whether licensing niceties have been observed
for each of the tens of thousands of works it distributes, and no easy way to assess or defend
against a claim if they have not.” Id.
There were some in the immediate aftermath of the first Garcia decision who felt that
the ruling’s impact would be minimal because contracts can be drawn up and signed that
remove the kind of interest Garcia attempted to assert in the absence of a contract. Id. In
response, however, opponents of the Garcia holding pointed out that if a potential copyright
claim has “even a hint of legitimacy,” whether or not it is actually valid, “service providers
will err on the side of caution by removing works in the face of a takedown demand in the
interest of gaining safe harbor from copyright liability.” Id. This notion once again returns to
the consequences of systems such as YouTube’s ContentID; despite YouTube and Google
fighting for free speech in Garcia, nobody can accurately predict how they would have no
behaved after having lost that fight. As system such as ContentID is the perfect framework
for an OSP to easily remove content that may or may not actually be infringing on a copyright.
Netflix argued,
By creating a new species of copyright, and empowering essentially any
performer in a motion picture or television program to both sue downstream
distributors and enjoin any use of her performance of which she does not
approve, the panel majority risks wreaking havoc with established copyright
and business rules on which all third party distributors, including Netflix,
depend.
Id. Content distributors such as YouTube and Netflix are simply not equipped to parse
through each individual claim and, thus, would likely find it easier to acquiesce than fight.
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The implications of Garcia extended beyond the content providers themselves as well.
Both NPR and The Washington Post argued that the subjects of unflattering news coverage
could, in effect, exercise a kind of veto power over broadcast, or public officials could claim
copyright in their prepared remarks and request video of a poor speaking performance be
taken down. Id. Documentary filmmakers, including Supersize Me director Morgan Spurlock,
also expressed concern about the subjects of their filmed interviews figuring out a way to
work the Garcia holding in their favor. Id. All told, the objecting parties included such
heavyweight

corporations

as

“Facebook,

eBay,

Gawker,

Twitter,

Yahoo,

IAC/InterActiveCorp, Tumblr, [and] Kickstarter” among others. Id.
III. Garcia v. Google 2
Intervening Facts
The parties urging a rehearing eventually won out and the Ninth Circuit agreed to
reconsider the Garcia holdng.10 Not all parties with an interest in the case came out against
the initial Garcia decision, however; one of the main proponents of the ruling was SAGAFTRA, the guild of film and television actors. Id. After the Ninth Circuit announced the
rehearing, SAG-AFTRA submitted its own amicus brief complete with references to famous
actors who, according to the guild, did bring originality to their performances. Id. According
to SAG-AFTRA, opponents of the original decision have argued that an actor is nothing more
the “‘a puppet’” that reads lines from a script the way the director tells them to. Id. In reality,
the guild argued, actors bring immense originality to their roles, even in roles that have been
portrayed numerous times by other actors. Id. Pointing to the character of Batman, the guild
Eriq Gardner, Actors Guild Gets Behind Copyrights For Some Performers, The Hollywood
Reporter (December 8, 2014). http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/actors-guildgets-behind-copyrights-754973.
10
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argued that each of the actors to have played the character brought something unique to it,
such that no two portrayals have ever been the same. Id. In addition, the guild mentioned
the late Heath Ledger’s performance as the Joker, including how the actor maintained in an
interview before his death that director Christopher Nolan had given him “free rein” to
discover the character over the course of a month. Id.
In any event, even though some copyright scholars, such as the famous David Nimmer,
argued that there may actually be a copyright interest in an actor’s performance, they still
felt that Garcia’s particular performance fell well short of whatever mark defines the
minimum requirements needed to obtain it. Id.

In response, the guild argued that any

performance, no matter how small, consists of the actor’s original expression and even
pointed to one of the great brief performances in film history: Robert Duvall’s speech about
the smell of napalm from Apocalypse Now. Id. Finally, the guild admitted that most major
studios are signatories to collective bargaining agreements that expressly limit the rights
contributors to films may have; while such agreements do not affect independent filmmakers
such as Youssef, the guild felt that in certain situations it is proper to award copyright
interests to an actor for his or her performance. Id. Garcia’s case, according to the guild, was
one of those instances. Id.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit set about conducting an en banc rehearing of the
Garcia decision and the majority came out with quite a different holding the second time
through. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747 (9th Cir. 2015) (Garcia 2).
Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions
Surprising few, the Ninth Circuit’s rehearing was essentially an excuse to completely
reverse the holding of the original Garcia opinion. Id. at 747. Judge McKeown’s opinion
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essentially echoed the sentiments of Judge Smith’s dissent in the original Garcia decision,
outlining them once again, point-by-point and in detail. Id. at 733-47. Without repeating the
entirety of the preceding section, certain new additions to each argument bear analysis.
Concerning the copyright claim, Judge McKeown brought up the Copyright Office and how it
had rejected Garcia’s application to copyright her performance. Id. at 741. The Office added
that it continued to support that traditional notion that a film is “a single integrated work”
and that Garcia’s performance is no severable from that work; absent any contribution to the
film other than her very brief performance, Garcia has no copyright interest in the film. Id. at
742. In addition, to hold that Garcia had a copyright interest in her brief performance could
also open the doors to film’s with enormous casts of extras (including Ben-Hur or The Lord
of the Rings) to have to negotiate the copyright interests of each extra prior to filming. Id. at
742-43. Such an outcome would not be practical for the film industry.
As to irreparable harm, the injuries claimed by Garcia (the threats to her life and her
fear of those threats) do not have anything to do with her copyright interests; the irreparable
harm question concerns harm to copyright interests alone, specifically the “value and
marketability” of the work or works at issue. Id. at 744-45. In Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC,
former professional wrestler Hulk Hogan sought an injunction against a website that had
posted a sex tape of himself with a mistress online, citing copyright issues. 913 F.Supp.2d
1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012). In Bollea, as in Garcia, “the only evidence in the record reflecting
harm . . . relates to harm . . . personally . . . due to the . . . nature of the Video's content . . . not
. . . irreparable harm in the context of copyright infringement.” Garcia 2, 786 F.3d at 745
(citing Bollea, 913 F.Supp.2d at 1329). Finally, again echoing the lack of urgency in Garcia’s
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filing as detrimental to her claim for irreparable harm, the opinion held against her. Garcia
2, 786 F.3d at 746.
The opinion after rehearing also included a concurrence from Judge Watford. Id. at
747. Interestingly, Judge Watford did not seem to agree that Garcia does not possess a
copyright interest in her short performance during “Innocence of Muslims.” Id. at 749. In fact,
the sole reason why Judge Watford concurred in the ultimate judgment was that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, on this record, Garcia failed to satisfy
the irreparable harm” analysis. Id. Judge Watford had a different take on the reasoning
behind Garcia’s failure to meet the irreparable harm standard, however, arguing:
The sad but unfortunate truth is that the threat posed to Garcia by issuance of
the fatwa will remain whether The Innocence of Muslims is available on
YouTube or not. Garcia is subject to the fatwa because of her role in making
the film, not because the film is available on YouTube. The film will
undoubtedly remain accessible on the Internet for all who wish to see it even
if YouTube no longer hosts it. Bottom line: Garcia's requested injunction won't
change anything about the content of the film or the part, however limited, she
played in its making.
Id. at 748. Even though Garcia’s actual role in the making of the film was misunderstood by
many in the Islamic community, and even though Garcia had taken several steps to ensure
that her true feelings on Islam were know to the world, the threats to her life did not cease.
Id. As a result, enjoining the video from appearing n YouTube would not result in a remedy
to the harm Garcia had been facing and, thus, she failed the irreparable harm analysis. Id.
Judge Kozinski, likely defending his radical position in the original Garcia opinion so
as not to appear completely wrong, wrote the dissent in Garcia 2. Id. at 749. The crux of Judge
Kozinski’s argument was that the alleged harms that would be suffered by film studios were
overstated, as were the potential harm to those internet companies that host the content
online. Id. at 749-53. Judge Kozinski appeared to be advocating for the separability of every
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scene in every film ever made, an outcome that would cause untold havoc in the world of
film. Id. at 750 (“If Garcia's scene is not a work, then every take of every scene of, say, Lord of
the Rings is not a work, and thus not protected by copyright, unless and until the clips become
part of the final movie”).
In addition, the dissent tried to draw a distinction between “joint authorship of a
movie” and “whether a contribution to a movie can be a ‘work.’” Id. The dissent hoped to
categorize every individual contribution to a film as its own copyrightable “work” that would
allow its creator to exercise some control over the contribution. Id. According to the dissent,
the fact that Garcia did not sign away her copyright interests to Youssef before recording the
film meant that she obtained rights to her performance the moment it was fixed on film. Id.
at 751. Such am interpretation of the facts neglects to consider the fact that such an
assignation of rights does not need to be obtained in writing to occur, something the dissent
even uses in support of its own contentions later in the opinion. Id. at 751-52. (“The harm
the majority fears would result from recognizing performers' copyright claims in their fixed,
original expression is overstated. The vast majority of copyright claims by performers in
their contributions are defeated by a contract and the work for hire doctrine . . . And most of
the performers that fall through the cracks would be found to have given an implied license
to the film's producers to use the contribution in the ultimate film.”).
It appears clear that both the majority in Garcia 1 and the dissent in Garcia 2 saw a
person in need of some assistance, any assistance that could be given, and wanted to aid her.
Such a proposition, while noble, does not take into account the numerous consequences of
action focused in the realm of copyright law. The new majority opinion remedied a fracture
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in the foundation of copyright in film and on the internet that could have led to a collapse of
epic proportions.
Reception to the Rehearing
As opposed to Garcia 1’s reception, the reception to Garcia 2 has been largely one of
relief and positivity. 11 As the vast majority of Garcia 1’s critics felt that the decision
constituted a prior restraint of free speech on the internet, it is not difficult to understand
why the reaction to Garcia 2 was so largely positive. Id. Despite the controversial views and
language contained within Youssef’s film, views and language that is quite repugnant in
truth, most observers felt that the remedies of copyright law should not be used to censor
the film from YouTube.12
Not all of those who supported the ultimate ruling by the Ninth Circuit on rehearing
had praise for the court itself, however; many were quick to voice their frustration that the
rehearing decision took over a year after the original opinion’s publication to come out. Id.
As the opinion in Garcia 1 was harmful to the First Amendment, critics of the Ninth Circuit
felt that they had abandoned the right to unrestrained free speech for over year while they
waited to correct their mistake. Id. In the end, however, it appeared as though only Judge
Kozinski himself was left defending the Garcia 1 opinion, while proponents of free speech on
the internet breathed a sigh of relief. Id. Even though the opinion following the rehearing
was only issued in May of 2015, the better law of the Garcia 2 opinion has already had the
Corynne McSherry, Finally! Victory for Free Speech in Garcia v. Google, Electronic Frontier
Foundation (May 18, 2015). https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/finally-victory-freespeech-garcia-v-google.
12 Michael Loney, Garcia v. Google Reversal Warmly Received (Except by Judge Kozinski),
Managing Intellectual Property - The Global IP Resource (May 20, 2015).
http://www.managingip.com/Blog/3455424/Garcia-v-Google-reversal-warmly-receivedexcept-by-Judge-Kozinski.html.
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opportunity to affect another Federal Circuit and its jurisprudence. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v.
Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2nd Cir. 2015).
IV. Subsequent Jurisprudence and Analysis
In 16 Casa Duse, a film production company in New York (“Casa Duse”) purchased the
rights to a screenplay called Heads Up with the intention of making it into a short film. Casa
Duse, 791 F.3d at 251. Krakovski, the owner of Casa Duse, approached Merkin to direct the
film; Merkin agreed and the two settled on a fee of $1,500 for Merkin’s services. Id. Krakovski
proceeded to hire a cast and crew for the film, with all the hiring subject to Krakovski final
say despite some minor input from Merkin. Id. Each cast and crew member other than
Merkin entered into a “work-for-hire” agreement with Casa Duse that assigned all copyright
interest in the film to Casa Duse. Id. Krakovski sent a copy of a similar agreement, called the
“Director Employment Agreement,” to Merkin, who acknowledge receipt and added that he
needed further time for review. Id. Merkin never executed the agreement and production
began anyway, with Merkin performing his duties as director over the course of a three-day
shoot. Id. When production concluded, Krakovski gave a hard drive containing the raw
footage from the shoot to Merkin in the hopes that Merkin would edit the footage. Id. To
effectuate this purpose, the parties entered into a “Media Agreement,” “under which Merkin
would edit but not license, sell, or copy the footage for any purpose without the permission
of Casa Duse.” Id. at 252. After negotiations for a final employment agreement fell through,
Merkin sent Krakovski an email claiming total ownership of the raw footage and forbidding
Krakovski from using it in any capacity. Id. Merkin also threatened to call all film festivals to
which Heads Up was being sent and telling them that he did not consent to its screening. Id.
Merkin even went so far as to register for a copyright on the film with the Copyright Office,
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claiming himself as the sole owner. Id. In March 2012, Krakovski submitted Heads Up to film
festivals and organized a screening for the New York Film Academy (NYFA); Merkin sent a
cease-and-desist notice to the NYFA in response. Id. at 253. Casa Duse missed out on
submission deadlines for four festivals as a result of the dispute, in addition to losing all the
money it had invested in the NYFA screening. Id.
Much like in Garcia v. Google, the district court in Casa Duse found that Merkin could
not copyright his creative contributions to the film and did not possess any copyright interest
in the final product. Id. at 255. On appeal, the parties agreed that Merkin was not a “joint
author” of Heads Up, nor were his contributions of the “work-for-hire” nature. Id. The main
dispute thus arose over whether Merkin could copyright his individual contributions to the
films. Id. Echoing the discussion found the in Garcia 1 dissent and the Garcia 2 majority, the
Second Circuit explained that the Copyright Act lists works such as motion pictures and
music recordings as eligible for copyright protection, however,
The [Copyright] Act lists none of the constituent parts of any of these kinds of
works as "works of authorship." This uniform absence of explicit protection
suggests that non-freestanding contributions to works of authorship are not
ordinarily themselves works of authorship.
Id. at 257. Further, the Act’s language mandating that individual contributions to works such
as films be "separate and independent" in order to be copyrightable on their own “indicates
that inseparable contributions integrated into a single work cannot separately obtain such
protection.” Id.
After mentioning the tumultuous procedural history of Garcia, the Second Circuit
immediately agreed with the Garcia 2 majority in holding that,
Filmmaking is a collaborative process typically involving artistic contributions
from large numbers of people, including—in addition to producers, directors,
and screenwriters—actors, designers, cinematographers, camera operators,
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and a host of skilled technical contributors. If copyright subsisted separately
in each of their contributions to the completed film, the copyright in the film
itself, which is recognized by statute as a work of authorship, could be
undermined by any number of individual claims.
Id. at 258. Of course, the Second Circuit also cautioned that a director can hold a copyright
interest in a film, provided he or she a sole or joint author of the film itself. Id. In addition,
the opinion mentions that authors of “freestanding works” that are then included in a film,
such as a “dance performance or a song,” can retain copyright interest in those contributions.
Id. at 259. Finally, as in Garcia 2, the Second Circuit majority mentioned the policy argument
that “a conclusion other than [this one] would grant contributors like Merkin greater rights
than joint authors, who . . . have no right to interfere with a co-author's use of the copyrighted
work.” Id.
The Casa Duse opinion served to bolster the contention that the Garcia 1 decision was
wrongly decided and went against public policy concerning both copyright law and the
freedom of speech itself. The relative swiftness of the Casa Duse opinion, practically on the
heels of the Garcia 2 opinion, also illustrates that the Garcia 2 opinion was one that other
Circuits had been paying close attention to. It appeared as though, in the wake of Garcia 2,
that copyright on the internet had received a major and lasting victory. The legal
community’s relief after the Garcia 2 decision may have been premature, however, as the
another Ninth Circuit case is setting up to have important ramifications in the realm of
copyright.
In 2007, a mother in Pennsylvania uploaded to YouTube a video of her baby dancing
to the song “Let’s Go Crazy” by Prince. 13 Prince’s publishers objected to the video being
Ben Sisario, YouTube ‘Dancing Baby’ Copyright Ruling Sets Fair Use Guideline, The New
York Times (September 14, 2015).
13
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hosted online and, in an act of defiance, the mother filed a lawsuit; the case has languished
in limbo for eight years since. Id. In a decision that cleared the way for the case to finally go
to trial, the Ninth Circuit held “that copyright holders must consider fair use before asking
services like YouTube to remove videos that include material they control.” Id. This ruling
has enormous implications for copyright on the internet, specifically on YouTube
considering the site’s ContentID system, but also for any site that can be affected by a DMCA
takedown notice. Id. As with Garcia, the case appears to be dividing supporters one more,
with,
The Motion Picture Association of America and the R.I.A.A. both [supporting]
Universal, which argued that fair use should be considered an “affirmative
defense” only when part of an infringement suit. On the other side of the issue,
Google, Twitter and Tumblr rallied behind Ms. Lenz [and her fair use/burdenshifting argument.]
Id. By placing such an emphasis on justifying DMCA takedowns against content that may
constitute fair use, the Ninth Circuit has dealt a serious blow to the DMCA’s structure; only
the outcome of the so-called “Dancing Baby Case” will hold the answer to how serious the
blow actually is.
V. Conclusion
The original Garcia v. Google opinion, and its subsequent rehearing, generated a good
deal of controversy while also highlighting the just how overlooked the interplay between
copyright law and freedom of speech truly is. Since the rise of video hosting websites such
as YouTube, the protections afforded to copyright holders under the DMCA have been used
more often as a sword than as a shield. The original holding in the Garcia case would have
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only sharpened that blade by providing many more people than Congress ever intended with
the ability to issue takedown notices to videos for which they contributed even the most
minimal of creative content. Even though the Garcia rehearing corrected the original
opinion’s grave mistake, the fight for an acceptable balance between copyright law and free
speech on the Internet has continued and will continue for years to come. Thankfully, it
appears as though the courts with the most to say in these matters have started to see things
in a way that provides hope for the conflict going forward.

